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                     Abstract 
 
The paper investigates the effects on welfare of price discrimination when a 
multimarket seller faces competition in one of its two markets. With respect 
to uniform pricing, price discrimination changes competition in such a way, 
that  even  with  linear  demands,  price  discrimination  can  be  welfare-
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A well-known result in the economics of monopolistic third degree price discrimination is 
that a move from uniform pricing to third degree price discrimination reduces welfare if total 
output decreases. Robinson (1933) shows that if a monopolist faces two independent linear 
demand curves, the use of price discrimination will not affect industry output but will reduce 
welfare.  Schmalensee  (1981)  proves  this  conjecture  assuming  nonlinear  demand  curves, 
perfectly separated markets and constant marginal cost.
1 Varian (1985) extends the result by 
allowing imperfect arbitrage, so that demand in any market can depend on prices in other 
markets,  and  by  allowing  marginal  cost  to  be  constant  or  increasing.
2  Using  a  revealed-
preference argument, Schwartz (1990) generalizes the result to the case in which marginal 
cost is decreasing (see also Bertoletti, 2004, for more recent analysis).
3 
 
Theoretical literature on the welfare effects of price discrimination has mainly focused on the 
case  of  final  good  monopolies.  As  Katz  (1987)  claims,  monopoly  is  precisely  a  market 
structure  where  antidiscrimination  legislations  do  not  apply.  For  instance,  the  Robinson-
Patman Act concerns harm to competition, but in the case of a final good monopoly there is 
no  competition  among  either  sellers  or  buyers.
4  Despite  the  empirical  relevance  and  the 
importance for the competition policy, there are not many works analyzing the effects of price 
discrimination on competition and welfare in oligopolistic frameworks. Notable exceptions, 
where discriminating oligopolists are discussed, are the papers by Neven and Phlips (1985), 
                                            
1 Ippolito (1980) by decomposing the change in social welfare into two effects provides an earlier, easier and 
more intuitive proof. See, also Aguirre (2011). 
2 It is important to point out that the latter result depends on the assumption that all markets are served under 
both pricing regimes. Some authors have shown that when there are two potential markets price discrimination 
may lead, by opening markets, to a Pareto welfare improvement. Hausman and MacKie-Mason (1988) show that 
if the marginal cost is constant or falling, then price discrimination results in a Pareto improvement if it serves to 
open new markets. Even when price discrimination does not open new markets Hausman and MacKie-Mason 
(1988) and Nahata et al. (1990) have shown that price discrimination can result in a Pareto improvement by 
lowering prices in all markets. 
3 Aguirre, Cowan and Vickers (2010) find sufficient conditions for third-degree price discrimination to increase 
social welfare related to the shape of inverse and direct demand functions. 
4  On  the  other  hand,  some  recent  empirical  works  have  analyzed  price  dispersion  in  oligopolistic  markets. 
Evidence of price discrimination is found by Shepard (1991) for the (Massachusetts) retail gasoline market, by 
Borenstein and Rose (1994) for the U.S. airline industry, and by Verboven (1996) for the European car market. 
In these works, neither cost differences nor peak-load pricing seem to be the most plausible explanations for the 
observed price differences.    -3- 
 
 




Neven  and  Phlips  (1985)  state  that  whenever  demand  has  a  different  price  elasticity  in 
different markets, oligopolists will tend to price discriminate exactly in the same way as the 
discriminating  monopolist  would.  They  consider  a  multimarket  Cournot  duopoly,  with 
homogeneous  product,  and  conclude  that  allowing  duopolists  to  discriminate  between 
submarkets leads to a welfare loss.
6 Holmes (1989) also studies a discriminating duopoly, but 
firms produce differentiated products and compete in prices. In his model, equilibrium price 
differentials  can  be  accounted  for  both  by  differences  in  cross-price  elasticity  as  well  as 
differences in industry-demand elasticity. In fact, as this author (and Borenstein, 1985) shows 
price  discrimination  may  increase  as  a  market  moves  from  monopoly  to  imperfect 
competition. He compares total industry output when the firms can discriminate between two 
markets with that output under uniform pricing. What determines which regime has a larger 
output is the sum of an adjusted-concavity condition and an elasticity-ratio condition.    
 
Adachi and Matsushima (2011) show that price discrimination can improve social welfare 
(especially) if firms’ brands are substitutes in the market where the discriminatory price is 
higher and are complements in the market where it is lower, but it never improves in the 
reverse  case.  They  verify,  however,  that  consumer  surplus  is  never  improved  by  price 
discrimination: welfare improvement by price discrimination is solely the result of an increase 
in the firms’ profits. 
 
We consider a multimarket seller facing competition in one of its two markets, and show that 
the pricing policy, price discrimination or uniform pricing, of the multimarket established 
                                            
5  See  also  Borenstein  (1985)  for  an  analysis  of  price  discrimination  in  monopolistically  competitive 
environments.  In  a  setting  of  spatial  competition  DeGraba  (1987)  shows  that  the  use  or  non  use  of  price 
discrimination  by  a  national  firm  can  affect  nonprice  decisions  made  by  local  firms  that  compete  with  the 
national firm.  A related literature is that of spatial price discrimination (an intermediate case between first and 
third-degree price discrimination). See, for example, Lederer and Hurter (1986) and Thisse and Vives (1988). 
See also Stole (2007) and Liu and Serfes (2010) for excellent surveys on price discrimination in oligopoly.  
6 Neven and Phlips consider linear demands and the total output, as occurs under monopoly, is unchanged by 
price discrimination.   -4- 
 
 
firm  meaningfully  affects  competition  in  the  duopolistic  market,  both  under  strategic 
substitutes  and  strategic  complements.
7  Under  price  discrimination,  and  just  like  a 
monopolist, the multimarket firm charges more in the market with the lowest elasticity of 
demand;  the  qualification  being  that  a  monopolist  faces  market  demands  whereas  the 
multimarket seller faces a residual demand in the duopolistic market, given the rival´s price. 
Following Robinson’s (1933) terminology, let us call one market the “strong” market and the 
other the “weak” market.
8 Under price competition, when the duopolistic market is weak, 
price discrimination makes the multimarket firm more aggressive (by reducing prices) in price 
competition and the rival also reacts more aggressively. As a consequence, there is a fall in 
the  profit  of  the  rival  in  the  duopolistic  market  and  the  effect  on  the  total  profit  of  the 
multimarket seller is ambiguous (given that its profits in the monopolistic market increase). If 
the  duopolistic  market  is  strong,  price  discrimination  leads  to  a  moderation  of  price 
competition and the profits of the firms are higher than those under uniform pricing. 
9 Under 
quantity competition, when the duopolistic market is weak, price discrimination makes the 
multimarket firm more aggressive (by increasing its output) and the rival reacts being less 
aggressive. As a consequence, there is a fall in the profit of the rival in the duopolistic market 
and the total profit of the multimarket seller increase. If the duopolistic market is strong, price 
discrimination makes the multimarket firm less aggressive (by decreasing its output) and the 
rival reacts more aggressively. As a consequence the profit of the rival increases and the effect 
on the total profit of the multimarket seller is ambiguous. 
 
                                            
7 Note that this is a fit setting given that a common feature of most cases under antidiscrimination litigation is 
that competition varies across markets. See Hausman and MacKie-Mason (1988) for an interesting case in which 
Du Pont’s adversary (Akzo) charged that third-degree price discrimination practices were a misuse of a patent. 
See other cases in, for example, Scherer and Ross (1990) or Varian (1989).     
8 Under monopoly, a strong (weak) market is defined as a market in which, at the profit maximizing uniform 
price, the market elasticity indicates that the profit in that market could be increased by increasing (decreasing) 
the price in that market. That is, in a strong (weak) market the discriminatory price is at least as great as (not 
greater than) the profit maximizing uniform price. In our case, what determines if the market is strong or weak is 
the elasticity of the multimarket seller’s residual demand, not the market demand. It must be pointed out that a 
market  may  be  strong  under  monopoly  but  weak  under  duopoly.  Many  works  in  the  literature  on  price 
discrimination  have  used  Robinson's  terminology.  See,  for  example,  Schmalensee  (1981),  Holmes  (1989), 
Malueg (1993), Layson (1994) or, more recently, Aguirre, Cowan and Vickers (2010).. 
9 Note that when the duopolistic market is strong uniform pricing would be optimal only if the objective of the 
multimarket seller were to deter entry or to induce exit. If this is the case and if there are not legal restrictions to 
price discriminate, the multimarket seller might commit itself to uniform pricing, for instance, by signing most-
favoured-customer clauses with its consumers (see Aguirre 2000).   -5- 
 
 
Varian (1985), (1989) formulates a general test for a move from uniform pricing to price 
discrimination to be welfare improving. Following his analysis, we obtain upper and lower 
bounds  on  welfare  change  when  a  move  is  made  by  the  multimarket  firm  from  uniform 
pricing  to  price  discrimination.  These  bounds  on  welfare  change  provide  necessary  and 
sufficient conditions for price discrimination to increase social welfare. Our main results are 
obtained by assuming linear demand functions. We show that price discrimination reduces 
welfare if the duopolistic market is weak, and that, if the duopolistic market is strong, it is 
satisfied the necessary condition for price discrimination to lead to a welfare improvement.. 
These results contrast with those obtained for the monopoly case: under linear demands price 
discrimination reduces welfare because the total output does not change. 
 
Our  findings  provide  an  interesting  competition  policy  implication.  Section  2(b)  of  the 
Robinson-Patman Act permits a seller to rebut the prima facie presumption of illegality by 
showing that its discriminatory price was quoted "in good faith to meet an equally low price 
of a competitor" (see, for example, Scherer and Ross, 1990, p. 514). However, if linearity of 
demand is not a bad approximation, we might expect the impact of price discrimination on 
welfare to be negative when the duopolistic market is weak. 
 
Several authors have stressed that the elimination of price discrimination can be particularly 
dangerous  if  it  leads  to  the  closure  of  markets.
10  We  analyze  the  effects  of  price 
discrimination on social welfare when the multimarket seller does not serve the weak market 
under  uniform  pricing.  If  the  duopolistic  market  is  weak,  price  discrimination  increases 
welfare given that uniform pricing leads to a monopolization of the weak market by the rival. 
If the duopolistic market is strong, price discrimination yields a Pareto improvement. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the basic model. In section 3, we 
analyze  the  effects  of  price  discrimination  on  price  and  quantity  competition  and  market 
structure.  Section  4  analyzes  the  welfare  effects  of  price  discrimination  and  discusses 
                                            
10 See, for example, Robinson (1933), Varian (1985) and Hausman and MacKie-Mason (1988). Layson (1994) 
derives conditions that determine when price discrimination will induce service to a market that otherwise would 
not be served under uniform pricing.    -6- 
 
 
implications for antitrust policy. Section 5 offers concluding remarks.  
 
2. The model 
 
Consider a multimarket firm, firm A, which sells one product in two separated markets. In 
market 1 firm A is a monopolist and it faces competition from firm B in market 2. Denote by 
2( , ) A B u x x y +   the  utility  function  (separable  and  linear  in  the  numeraire  good)  of  a 
representative  consumer  in  market  2.  Suppose  that  2( , ) A B u x x   is  a  differentiable  strictly 
concave function on 
2 R+ , which is strictly monotone in a nonempty bounded region  2 X . The 
maximization of the representative consumer yields an inverse demand system  2( , ) A B p x x , 
, , i A B =  where  xi is the amount  of good x  produced by firm i ( , i A B = ), which is twice-
continuously  differentiable  in  the  interior  of  2 X .  Inverse  demands  are  downward  sloping 
/ 0 i i p x ¶ ¶ < ,  , , i A B =   and  we  assume  that  firms  sell  substitutes  / 0 i j p x ¶ ¶ < , 
, , , j i i A B ¹ = .  The  inverse  demand  system  can  be  inverted  to  yield  a  demand  system 
( , ) i i A B x D p p = ,  , . i A B =  The bounded region in price space where demands are positive is 
denoted by  2 P . The demand system is twice-continuously differentiable in the interior of  2 P . 
Direct demands are downward sloping  / 0 i i D p ¶ ¶ <  and  / 0 i j D p ¶ ¶ > ,  , , , j i i A B ¹ = ; that 
is,
 the “own effect” is greater than the “cross effect”. We assume that  / / i i i j p x p x ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ >  
and  / / i i i j D p D p ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ > ,  , , , j i i A B ¹ = . Denote by  1 1 ( ) p x , the inverse demand, which is 
twice-continuously differentiable in the interior of  X1 (arising from maximizing the strictly 
concave quasi-linear utility of a representative consumer) and  1 1 ( ) D p  the demand in market 1, 
assumed to be downward sloping. Marginal production costs are constant and identical for 
both firms (and both markets),  0 A B c c c = = > . 
 
Firm i's profits in market 2 in terms of prices are  ( , ) ( ) ( , )
i
A B i i A B p p p c D p p p = - ,  , , i A B =  
and  in  terms  of  quantities,  ( , ) [ ( , ) ]
i
A B i A B i x x p x x c x p = - ,￿ , . i A B =   The  incumbent’s  profit 
function in market 1 is 
1
1 1 1 1 ( ) [ ( ) ] x p x c x p = - . We assume that either firm in market 2 can 
make positive profits even when the rival’s price is the marginal cost. This ensures interior 
solutions  in  equilibrium.  Moreover,  we  assume  that  0
i
ii p < ,  0
i
ij p > ,  0
i i
ii ij p p + < , 
, , , j i i A B ¹ = ,  and 
1
11 0 p < .  These  assumptions  ensure  that  Bertrand  and  Cournot  reaction   -7- 
 
 
functions  are  well  behaved  and  that  there  exist  unique  Bertrand  and  Cournot  equilibria. 
Furthermore, the incumbent's profit function in market 1 is concave and the monopoly output 
(and price) is well defined.  
 
Some of the main results of the paper will be obtained by considering the following linear 
inverse demands and demands systems:  
 
        1 1 1 1 1 ( ) p x x a b = -  
                     ( , ) A A B A B p x x x x a b g = - -           (1)
          ( , ) , B A B B A p x x x x a b g = - -  
 
        D1(p1) = a1 -b1p1 
        ( , ) A A B A B D p p a bp cp = - +           (2)
        ( , ) , B A B B A D p p a bp cp = - +  
 
with  1 1 a bc >   and  ( ) a b d c > - , where c is the marginal cost. Assumptions  1 1 a bc >   and 
( ) a b d c > - ensure that under price discrimination all markets are served. 
 
In section 3, we analyze the effects of price discrimination on the competition between firms 
(in terms of price levels, outputs and profits) and compare them with those arising under 
uniform pricing, and Section 4 provides the welfare implications.  
 
   -8- 
 
 
3.      The effects on competition of the multimarket seller’s price policy  
 
3.1. Price discrimination 
 
First,  we  assume  that  the  incumbent  firm  is  allowed  to  price  discriminate.  Firm  A  is  a 
monopolist in market 1 and a duopolist in market 2. Denote by  1 ( , , ) T A B p p p p  the total profit 
of firm A, where  1 1 1 ( , , ) ( ) ( , ) T A B A A B p p p p p p p p p = + . The profit maximization problem of 
the multimarket seller, firm I, is: 
 
         
1
1 1 1 , max ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , ).
A
A A A B p p p c D p p c D p p - + -   
           
 
The first-order conditions are: 
 





( ) ( ) 0,
T d dD p
D p p c
p dp dp
p p ¶
= = + - =
¶
         (3)
             
     
( , )
( , ) ( ) 0.
T A A A B
A A B A
A A A
D p p
D p p p c
p p p
p p ¶ ¶ ¶
= = + - =
¶ ¶ ¶
           (4)    
       
The first-order condition for the profit maximization problem of firm B is: 
 
          
( , )
( , ) ( ) 0.
B B A B
B A B B
B B
D p p
D p p p c
p p
p ¶ ¶
= + - =
¶ ¶
           (5)
             
Note that as the markets are separated, the price decisions of the multimarket seller for the 
two markets are independent. In market 1, from condition (3), firm A sets the monopoly price 
level,  1
m p ,  sells  the  monopoly  output,  1 1 1 ( )
m m x D p = ,  and  obtains  monopoly  profits,  1
m p . 
Conditions (4) and (5) implicitly define the best response functions of firm A and B,  ( ) A B R p  
and  ( ) B A R p . A Bertrand equilibrium is a pair of prices, 
*
A p   and 
*
B p ,  such that 
* * ( ) A A B p R p =  
and 
* * ( ) B B A p R p = .  The  equilibrium  outputs  are 
* * * ( , ) A A A B x D p p =   and 
* * * ( , ) B B A B x D p p = . 
Denote by 
*
A p  and 
*





T A p p p = +  .   -9- 
 
 
It is useful to rewrite first-order conditions in terms of price-cost mark up. Conditions (3) and 
(4) can be written, at the equilibrium prices, as: 
 
 










=  ,                (6)  
                   







A A A B
p c
p p p e
-
=  ,            (7) 
           
where   
'
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ( ) ( ) / ( ) p D p p D p e = -   and  ( , ) [ ( , )/ ] / ( , )
R
A A B A A B A A A A B p p D p p p p D p p e = - ¶ ¶  
 
are the demand elasticity of market 1 (in absolute value) and the elasticity of the multimarket 
seller’s  residual  demand  in  market  2,  respectively.
11  Optimal  pricing  implies  that  the 
multimarket seller should charge the lowest price in the market with the most elastic demand. 
 
3.2.    Uniform pricing 
 
Now assume that the multimarket seller is restricted to selling at a single price (because of, 
for instance, price discrimination is banned). Under uniform pricing the total profit function 
of the incumbent is  1 ( , , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) T B A B p p p p c D p p c D p p p = - + - . The first order condition 
is given by:  
 




( ) ( , )




dD p D p p
D p p c D p p p c
p dp p
p ¶ ¶
= + - + + - =
¶ ¶
,    (8)
       
which implicitly defines the reaction function of the multimarket seller under uniform pricing, 
                                            
11 Note that, as the products of the firms are substitutes in market 2, each firm would be charging too low a price 
from the point of view of the industry profits. If both products were produced by a monopolist, the Lerner index 
for each product would exceed the inverse of the own elasticity of demand. In particular, the price-cost markup 
of product i,  , , i A B =  would be 
( ) 1 j j ij i
R R
i i i i





= + , where  ( / )( / )
R
i i i i i D p p D e = - ¶ ¶  is the elasticity 
of  the  residual  demand  (the  own  elasticity  of  demand),    ( / )( / ) ij j i i j D p p D e = ¶ ¶   is  the  cross-elasticity  of 
demand for product j with respect to the price of product i, and  i i i R p D =   is the revenue associated with 





A B R p .
 It is easy to check that this reaction function also has a slope of less than one in 
absolute  value.  Denote  by 
u p and 
u
B p   the  equilibrium  prices  under  uniform  pricing.  The 
output of firm I in market 1 is  1 1( )
u u x D p =  and the equilibrium outputs in market 2 are 
( , )
u u u
A A B x D p p =  and  ( , )
u u u
E E E x D p p = . Let  1
u p  be the equilibrium profit of firm A in market 1 
and denote by 
u
A p and 
u
B p  equilibrium profits in market 2. The total profit of firm A under 
uniform pricing is  1
u u u
T A p p p = + .  
 




( ) ( , )
.
( ) ( ) ( , ) ( , )
u u u u
A B
u u u u u R u u
A B A B
D p D p p p c




            (9)
                     





( , ) ( )
u
u R u u u
A B
p c








( , ) ( , )
( ) ( ) ( , ) ( , )
u u R u u
A B A B
u u u u R u u
A B A B
D p p p p








Thus the mark-up satisfies:  
 
1 1
1 1 1 1
min , max , .
( ) ( , ) ( ) ( , )
u
u R u u u u R u u
A B A B
p c
p p p p p p p e e e e
    -
£ £    
   
 
 
Hence, with respect to uniform pricing, price discrimination increases the price in the less 





                                            
12 It must be stressed that elasticities differ between uniform price and price discrimination policies, given that 
elasticities generally depend on the price levels (which change with the pricing policy).   -11- 
 
 
3.3.   Comparison of results 
 
Firstly, we shall analyze the effects of the pricing policy of the multimarket seller on its 
strategic behaviour in the duopolistic market. In the next Lemma, which follows the lines of 
theorem 1 in Nahata et al. (1990), we state the relation between the reaction function of the 
multimarket seller under price discrimination with that under uniform pricing. 
 
Lemma 1. The concavity of the profits functions implies that: 
                          { } { } 1 1 min ( ), ( ) max ( ),
m u m
A B A B A B R p p R p R p p £ £ . 
 
Proof. Note that, given a rival’s price  B p , for  { } 1 min ( ),
m
A B p R p p < ,  the multimarket seller’s 
profit function under uniform pricing  1 ( , ) ( ) ( , ) T B A B p p p p p p p p = +  is an increasing function 
of p, provided that the profit functions  1 1 ( ) p p  and  ( , ) A A B p p p   are concave and achieve a 
maximum at  1
m p   and  ( ) A B R p , respectively. Similarly, for  { } 1 max ( ), ,
m
A B p R p p >   ( , ) I B p p p   
is  decreasing.  Therefore,  if  ( )
u
A B R p   maximizes  ( , ) T B p p p   then  it  is  satisfied  that 
{ } { } 1 1 ( ) min ( ), ,max ( ),
u m m
A B A B A B R p R p p R p p   Î .Q.E.D. 
 
The concavity of the profit functions (Lemma 1) and the fact that the reaction functions are 
upward sloping allow us to state the following relation between the equilibrium prices. 
 
Lemma 2.  (i)  { } { }
* *
1 1 min , max ,
m u m
A A p p p p p £ £ . 
           (ii) If 
* u
A p p ³   then 
* u
B B p p ³  and if 
* u
A p p £  then 
* u
B B p p £  (and vice versa). 
Proof. See Appendix.  
 
Part (i) of Lemma 2 states that the multimarket seller under price discrimination raises the 
price  at  one  market  and  lowers  it  at  the  other,  and  part  (ii)  is  a  direct  consequence  of 
competition with strategic complements. Following Robinson’s (1933) terminology, let us 
call one market the strong market and the other the weak market. The duopolistic market, 
market 2, is strong (weak) if the discriminatory price in that market is at least as great as (no   -12- 
 
 
greater  than)  the  profit  maximizing  uniform  price;  that  is,  market  2  is  strong  (weak)  if 
1 ( , ) ( ) ( )
R u u u
A B p p p e e < > .
13  Similarly,  a  market  is  strong  (weak)  if  the  multimarket  firm’s 
discriminatory price is higher (lower) in that market than in the other market. 
 




A p p p ³ ³  and 
* u
B B p p £ , and 




A p p p ³ ³  and 
* u
B B p p ³ . In order to understand 
these results and to state the effects of the multimarket seller’s pricing policy on profits, it is 
useful to consider a move from uniform pricing to price discrimination. 
  
Marginal profits in market 1 and 2 of the multimarket seller at the equilibrium prices under 
uniform pricing ( , )
u u
B p p  can be expressed, respectively, as: 
 














= -  
 
         (10)
                   
   
( , )
( , ) 1 ( , ) .
u u u
u u R u u A B
A B A B u
A
p p p c




  ¶ -
= -   ¶  
          (11)
       
By substituting the price-cost margin from (9) and omitting arguments, we get: 
 
                                                 1 1
1
1 1 1












=   +  
            (12) 
 
                                         
1 1
1 1











  ¶ -
=   ¶ +  
         (13)
         
The signs of (12) and (13) depend on the relation between elasticities.
 When the duopolistic 
                                            
13 It must be pointed out that we use a duopoly-defined measure; that is, under another market structure the 
classification of a market as strong or weak might differ. For example, market 2 may be strong under monopoly 
but  weak  under  duopoly.  As  we will show, this fact may lead the multimarket seller to engage in a price 
discrimination policy that results in the lowest price precisely in the market where the maximization of the 
industry profits requires the highest. As a consequence, price discrimination may reduce the multimarket seller’s 
profit. Other types of competition, different from simultaneous price competition, might also affect the strong-
weak ranking between markets.   -13- 
 
 
market is weak   1 ( , ) ( )
R u u u



















 ￿and thus, given 
that profit functions are concave (Lemma 1 and 2),  1
m u p p >  and  ( ) ( )
u u u u
A B A B p R p R p = > . Note 
that price discrimination makes the multimarket seller become more aggressive in market 2; 
with strategic complements, the rival’s optimal response to this more aggressive play by the 
multimarket firm is to become more aggressive, and firm B reacts also by decreasing its 
price.




A p p p > >   and 
* u
B B p p > .
15  As  a  consequence,  firm  A  increases  its 
output and the market share of firm B decreases (the decrease in the price of firm A is higher 
than the decrease in the price of firm B). The effect of price discrimination on the multimarket 
seller’s total profits is ambiguous; although its profits in market 1 increase, they can decrease 
in  market  2.  It  is  easy  to  check,  by  using  the  first  order  condition,  that 
( ) ( ), / 0 B B A A A d R p p dp p > , and therefore, price discrimination results in a decrease in the 
rival’s profit, 
* u
B B p p < . 
 
When  the  duopolistic  market  is  strong  1 ( , ) ( )
R u u u



















  thus,  1 ( ) ( )
u u u u m
A B A B R p R p p p > = > . In this case price discrimination makes 
the multimarket seller become less aggressive (by raising its price) in market 2. With strategic 
complements, the rival’s optimal response to a less aggressive play by firm A is to be less 





A p p p > >  and 
* u
B B p p > . As a consequence, firm A reduces its output and the market share of firm B is 
increased; note that, as reaction functions have slope less than one, the increase in the price of 
firm A is higher than the increase in the price of firm B. Note that  ( ) , ( ) / 0
u u
A B A d p R p dp p >  
and, therefore, this moderation in price competition results in an increase in the profits of both 
firms;  
* u
A A p p >  and 
* u
B B p p > . In market 1 the multimarket seller reduces its price,  1
m u p p < , 
                                            
14  It  is  easy  to  check  that  price  discrimination  shifts  inward  the  reaction  curve  of  the  multimarket  seller, 
( ) ( )
u
A B A B R p R p >  at least for  { } { }
* * min , ,max ,
u u
B B B B B p p p p p   Î  . Given that the rival’s reaction function is 
upward sloping, price discrimination reduces the price of both firms in the duopolistic market.  
15 We are now assuming that both markets are served by the multimarket firm under uniform pricing and that 
elasticities differ across markets and therefore, the relation between prices holds with strict inequalities. 
16  Price  discrimination  shifts  outward  the  reaction  curve  of  the  multimarket  seller,  ( ) ( )
u
A B A B R p R p < for 
{ } { }
* * min , ,max ,
u u
B B B B B p p p p p   Î  .  Given  that  the  rival’s  reaction  function  is  upward  sloping,  price 
discrimination leads to an increase in the price of both firms in the duopolistic market.   -14- 
 
 
and therefore, its sales and profits in this market go up,  1 1
m u p p > . Therefore, when price 
discrimination makes the incumbent less aggressive, its total profits are increased: 
* u
T T p p > . 
The following proposition summarizes the above results:  
 
Proposition 1.  Under Bertrand competition (strategic complements), with respect to uniform 
pricing: 
 
(i) If the duopolistic market is weak ( 1 ( , ) ( )
R u u u
A B p p p e e > ) price discrimination reduces the 
profits of the single-market firm, and the effect on the total profit of the multimarket seller is 
ambiguous given that its profits in market 1 increase. 
 
(ii) If the duopolistic market is strong ( 1 ( , ) ( )
R u u u
A B p p p e e < ) price discrimination increases 
the profits of both firms.
17 
 
In  order  to  illustrate  how  the  ability  to  price  discriminates  can  reduce  the  profit  of  the 
multimarket seller when the duopolistic market is weak, we shall consider the linear demands 
case (see, (2)). The change in the profit of the multimarket seller due to a move from uniform 
pricing to price discrimination is given by:  
 
{







b d bb A
b b d
p   D = - +   G -
 
 
         [ ]} 1 1 1 4 (2 ) (2 ) [ ( ) ] 2 ( ) , bd b d b d d a b d c bd a bc + - + - - + -          (14) 
 
where  1 1 1 1 2 2 A ab a b a d bdc = - + +  and 
2
1 4 ( ) b b b d   G = + -  . It is easy to check that if market 
2  is  weak  ( 1 ( , ) ( )
R u u u
A B p p p e e > ),  then  0 A< ,  whereas  if  market  2  is  strong 
( 1 ( , ) ( )
R u u u
A B p p p e e < ), then  0 A > . Note that when the duopolistic market is strong, price 
discrimination  increases  the  profit  of  the  multimarket  seller  (proposition  1).
18  The  next 
                                            
17 If  1 ( , ) ( )
R u u u
A B p p p e e =  the market outcome would be the same under both pricing policies.  
18 Note that if market 2 is strong under duopoly, it will also be strong under monopoly. Therefore, the direction 
of the price discrimination policy (higher prices in market 2) is correct from the point of view of the industry 
profits. As a consequence, the multimarket seller’s profit increases with price discrimination.    -15- 
 
 
Corollary allows us to understand under what conditions price discrimination can reduce the 
profit of the multimarket seller. 
 
Corollary 1.  If the profits of the multimarket firm are reduced by price discrimination, then 
this firm would be practising a type of price discrimination contrary to that which maximizes 
the industry profit.  
 
That is, market 2 is weak under competition (from the point of view of the multimarket seller) 
whereas, under multiproduct monopoly, market 2 would be strong. It is easy to check that 
price  discrimination  reduces  the  multimarket  seller’s  profit  if  the  following  condition  is 
satisfied:  
 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2
1
2 ( ) 2 (4 ) 8 (2 ) 2[4 ( ) ]
(2 ) [ ( ) ] (2 ) (4 ) 8 (2 )
b a bc b b d bb b d b b b d d
b d a b d c b d b d bb b d
- - + - + + -
< <
- - - - - + -
    (15) 
 
The left side inequality of (15) defines market 2, the duopolistic market, as weak,
19 and the 
right side inequality of (15) implies that discrimination reduces profits. It is straightforward to 
check that if condition (15) is satisfied then  [ ] [ ] { } 1 1 1 / ( ) /( ) a bc a b d c b b d - - - < - , but this 
implies that market 2 would be strong for a monopolist; that is  1
m m
I p p > , where 
m
A p  denotes 
the price charged by a multiproduct monopolist in market 2 under price discrimination.
20 
Therefore, the competition between firms transforms a strong market into a weak one. Thus, 
each firm under competition would be charging too low a price from the point of view of the 
industry  profits  (firms  do  not  take  into  account  that  products  are  substitutes  and  that  an 
increase in the price of one product raises the demand for the other product).   
 
The following proposition summarizes the results under quantity competition. 
                                            
19 The equilibrium prices under price discrimination are 
* * ( )/ (2 ) A B p p a bc b d = = + -  and  1 1 1 1 ( )/ 2
m p a bc b = + . 




A p p > ,  then  [ ] [ ] { } 1 1 1 / ( ) 2 / (2 ) a bc a b d c b b d - - - > - ,  or 
equivalently  0. A <  
20  The  optimal  prices  of  the  multimarket  monopolist  under  price  discrimination  are 
[ ( ) ]/ 2( )
m m
A B p p a b d c b d = = + - - and 1 1 1 1 ( )/ 2
m p a bc b = + ; therefore, if { } 1 1 1 ( )/[ ( ) ] /( ) a bc a b d c b b d - - - < - ) 
then  1
m m




Proposition 2.  Under Cournot competition (strategic substitutes), with respect to uniform 
pricing: 
 
(i) If the duopolistic market is weak price discrimination reduces the profits of the single-
market firm, and increases the total profit of the multimarket seller. 
 
(ii) If the duopolistic market is strong price discrimination increases the profits of the single-
market firm and the effect on the total profit of the multimarket seller is ambiguous given that 
its profits in market 1 increase. 
 
We next provide the intuition for proposition 2 for the case of homogeneous product. Banning 
price discrimination (that is, uniform pricing) imposes a constraint  2 2 ( ) ( ) A A B p x x p x + =  to 
the multimarket firm. From first order condition of the constraint maximization problem we 
get (omitting arguments): 
 








x x p c




             (16) 
 
The multimarket firm’s marginal profits in market 1 and 2 at the equilibrium outputs under 
uniform pricing are: 
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2 1














    (17)   
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u u u u
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A B x x x = +  is the total output and  2 /
u u u
A A s x x =  is the multimarket seller’s share in 
market  2.  When  the  duopolistic  market  is  weak  then  ( , )/ 0
u u
A A B A x x x p ¶ ¶ >   and   -17- 
 
 
1 1 1 ( )/ 0.
u d x dx p <  Under price discrimination the multimarket firm becomes more aggressive 
in market 1 and under strategic substitutes, the rival reacts being less aggressive: therefore, 
* u
A B x x > , 
* u
B B x x <  and  1 1.
m u x x <  As a consequence the profits of the rival firm decreases with 
price discrimination  and the multimarket seller’s profits increases. 
 
When  the  duopolistic  market  is  strong  then  ( , )/ 0
u u
A A B A x x x p ¶ ¶ <   and  1 1 1 ( )/ 0.
u d x dx p >  
Under price discrimination the multimarket firm becomes less aggressive in market 1 and 
under strategic substitutes, the rival reacts being more aggressive: therefore, 
* u
A A x x < , 
* u
B B x x >  
and  1 1.
m u x x >   As  a  consequence  the  profits  of  the  rival  firm  increases  with  price 
discrimination  and the effect on the total profit of the multimarket seller is ambiguous given 
that its profits in market 1 increase. 
 
3.4.   Market opening under price discrimination 
 
In the above analysis we have assumed that the multimarket firm pricing policy (or the legal 
status of price discrimination) does not affect its decision on whether to serve markets. The 
following  corollary  analyzes  some  potential  effects  of  the  pricing  policy  on  the  market 
structure. 
 
Corollary  2.  (i)  If  the  duopolistic  market  is  weak,  uniform  pricing  may  lead  to  a 
monopolization of this market by the rival. (ii) If the duopolistic market is strong, uniform 
pricing may induce the multimarket seller not to serve the weak market (market 1).  
 
Note that the uniform price can be so high that no purchases are made in markets that would 
otherwise be profitably served under price discrimination. When the duopolistic market is 
weak, if  1 1( ) ( , )
m u u u
A B p p p p p p > +   then under uniform pricing the multimarket seller would 
not serve market 2 and would fix a price  1
m p . As a consequence, firm E would remain as a 
monopolist in market 2 and price at  2
m p . Suppose that the duopolistic market is strong, if 
market 1 is not served under uniform pricing then the equilibrium prices would be 
*
A p  and 
*
E p . Therefore, uniform pricing closes market 1 when 
*
1( ) ( , )
u u u
I A B p p p p p p > + ; the opening   -18- 
 
 
of market 1 does not offset  the profit loss in market 2.   
 
In the next section, we shall analyze the effects of the pricing policy (price discrimination or 
uniform pricing) of the multimarket seller on social welfare taking into account the above 
effects on the competition derived from one or the other policy.  
 
4.   Effects on social welfare 
 
It is well known that, even in the pure monopoly case, a move from uniform pricing to price 
discrimination has in general ambiguous consequences on social welfare. The differences in 
price between markets, due to price discrimination, entail a loss of efficiency because the 
marginal valuations of output are not the same across buyers. As a consequence a necessary 
condition for price discrimination to increase social welfare is that output increases. In this 
work, the existence of competition in one market introduces additional effects that make the 
welfare  question  more  difficult  to  answer.  A  move  by  the  multimarket  seller  from  price 
discrimination to uniform pricing actually makes marginal utilities equal across its buyers. 
However,  the  strategic  effect  derived  from  the  pricing  policy  change  leads  to  marginal 
valuations  of  the  products  of  both  firms  which  are  not  equal.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
multimarket firm pricing policy (or the legal status of price discrimination) may affect its 
decision on whether to serve markets. We address the issue by establishing upper and lower 
bounds on welfare change. Our analysis is based on the general test for welfare improvement 
proposed by Varian (1985), (1989).  
 
Consider an aggregate utility function of the form  1 ( , , ) A B u x x x y + ,
21 where  i x ,  , , i A B =  are 
the product varieties consumed in market 2,  1 x  is the consumption in market 1 and y  is the 
money to be spent on other goods. We assume that  u  is concave and differentiable. The 
inverse  demand  functions  are  given  by  1 1 ( , , ) ( , , )/ j A B A B j p x x x u x x x x = ¶ ¶ ,  1, , . j A B =  
                                            
21 We wish to use the classical measure of social welfare as consumers' plus producers’ surplus, and the most 
general preference structure for which this is possible is that of quasi-linear utility. This class of preferences 
satisfies the condition that not only does consumers’ surplus serve as a legitimate measure of individual welfare, 
but  also  individual  consumers'  utility  functions  can  be  added  up  to form a social utility function, thus the 
aggregate consumers’ surplus is also meaningful. See Varian (1985).   -19- 
 
 
Consider two configurations of output, 
0 0 0
1 ( , , ) A B x x x  and 
1 1 1
1 ( , , ) A B x x x , with associated prices 
0 0 0
1 ( , , ) A B p p p  and 
1 1 1
1 ( , , ) A B p p p . By using the concavity of the aggregate utility function we 
obtain: 
 
       
0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
1 1 1 1
1
( , , )
( , , ) ( , , ) ( )
A B
A B A B
u x x x







                          
0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 1 1 ( , , ) ( , , )
( ) ( ).
A B A B
A A B B
A B
u x x x u x x x
x x x x
x x
¶ ¶
+ - ++ -
¶ ¶
     (19) 
 
By rearranging and using the definition of inverse demand function we have: 
 
     
0 0 0
1 1 , A A B B u p x p x p x D £ D + D + D            (20)
             
where 
1 1 1 0 0 0
1 1 ( , , ) ( , , ) A B A B u u x x x u x x x D = -   and 
1 0,  1, , . j j j x x x j A B D = - =   Using  a  similar 
argument, we get: 
 
              
1 1 1
1 1 . A A B B u p x p x p x D ³ D + D + D            (21)
     
Under constant marginal cost the change in total cost is  1 . A B C c x c x c x D = D + D + D  Since 
W u C D = D -D , we obtain upper and lower bounds on welfare change: 
 
0 0 0 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) . A A B B A A B B p c x p c x p c x W p c x p c x p c x - D + - D + - D ³ D ³ - D + - D + - D (22)  
 
If  ( , , )
u u u
B p p p are  the  prices  when  the  multimarket  seller  engages  in  uniform  pricing  and 
* *
1 ( , , )
m
A B p p p the discriminatory prices, then: 
 
* *
1 1 1 ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .
u u m
A B B A A B B p c x x p c x W p c x p c x p c x - D +D + - D ³ D ³ - D + - D + - D   (23)  
   
The upper bound implies that a necessary condition for welfare to increase is that the sum of 
weighted  output  changes  is  positive,  where  the  weights  are  the  price-cost  margins  under   -20- 
 
 
uniform pricing. Notice that if firm A and B sold independent products, we would obtain the 
traditional  result  according  to  which  an  increase  in  total  industry  output  is  a  necessary 
condition  for  price  discrimination  to  be  welfare  improving.  The  lower  bound  gives  a 
sufficient condition for welfare to increase under price discrimination, namely, that the sum of 
the weighted output changes is positive, where the weights are the equilibrium price-cost 
margins under price discrimination. 
 
In order to stress the relevance of the above bounds on welfare, we shall next consider the 
case of linear demands. Assume that the inverse demands and direct demands systems are 
given by (1) and (2).
22 The following lemma provides an exact measure of the welfare change 
under linear demands. 
 
Lemma  3.    Under  linear  demands  and  constant  marginal  cost,  the  welfare  change  is  the 




W UB LB D = +  
Proof. See Appendix. 
 
Note  that,  under  linear  demands  and  constant  marginal  cost,  a  necessary  and  sufficient 
condition for price discrimination to be welfare improving is that the upper bound is higher 
than the lower bound in absolute value.
23  
 
The changes of the output  in market 1 and the output of firms A  and B  in market 2, which 
are due to a move from uniform pricing to price discrimination, are given by: 
 
 
                                            
22 The aggregate utility function is given by:  
2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1
1 1
( , , ) ( ) ( 2 ) .
2 2
A B A B A A B B u x x x x x x x x x x x y a b a b g b = - + + - + + +  
The  maximization  of  the  representative  consumers  in  markets  1  and  2  yields  the  demand  system  where 
1 1
1 1 2 2 2 2
1 1
, , ,  and  . a b a b d
a a a b g
b b b g b g b g
= = = = =
+ - -
 
23 It must be pointed out that this result only depends on the linearity of demands (and on the assumption of 
constant marginal cost) and it holds for arbitrary configurations of prices. In particular, it holds both under 















    




















     (24) 
   
where  1 1 1 1 2 2 A ab a b a d bdc = - + +  and 
2
1 4 ( ) b b b d   G = + -  .  The multimarket seller’s total 
output change is: 
 










           (25) 
 
It is easy to check that the upper bound (UB) and the lower bound (LB) on welfare change are 
given by: 
 
  [ ][ ] { } 1 1 1 2 4 ( ) (4 ) ( ) 4 ( ,
2 (2 )
dA
UB b b b b d d a b d c bd a bc
b d
= + + + - - + -
G -
   (26) 
 
  [ ] { } 1 2
1
(2 )
(2 ) 2 ( ) .
4 (2 )
b d A
LB b d A bd a b d c
b b d
+
= - - + - -
G -
        (27) 
         
The next proposition states the effects on social welfare of price discrimination with respect 
to uniform pricing. 
 
Proposition  3.    (i)  If  the  duopolistic  market  is  weak  ( 1 ( , ) ( )
R u u u




I p p > ), price discrimination reduces social welfare. (ii) If the duopolistic market is strong 
( 1 ( , ) ( )
R u u u




I p p < ), it is satisfied the necessary condition for price 
discrimination to increase social welfare. 
  
Proof. It is easy to check that if market 2 is weak ( 1 ( , ) ( )
R u u u
A B p p p e e > ), then  0 A< , whereas  
if market 2 is strong ( 1 ( , ) ( )
R u u u
A B p p p e e < ), then  0 A > . Thus, if market 2 is weak, the upper 
bound  on  welfare  change  is  negative  (see  (26))  and,  consequently,  price  discrimination 
reduces welfare. Note that, from (24) and (25),  1 0 A x x D +D <  and  0 B x D < , and therefore the 
two terms of the upper bound (see condition (23)) are negative. If market 2 is strong then the 
upper bound (26) is positive; note that  1 0 A x x D +D >  and  0 B x D > . Therefore, the necessary   -22- 
 
 
condition for price discrimination to increase welfare is satisfied. Q.E.D. 
 
Quantity competition 





































     (28) 
 
where  1 1 2 2 C ab a b a g = - -  and 
2 2
1 1 4 ( ) (2 ) b b b g b b F = + - + . 
 
It is easy to check that if market 1 is weak (strong) then  0 C < ( 0 C > ). The upper bound (UB) 
on welfare change can be written: 
 
   
2 2





ab b g abb b g g ab a g
b g
  = - + - + +   F +
  (29) 
 
The sign of this expression depends on the sign of C. If market 1 is weak ( 0 C < ) then the 
upper bound is negative and hence price discrimination reduces welfare. If market 1 is strong 
( 0 C > ) then the neccessary condition for price discrimination to increase welfare is satisfied. 
The lower bound is: 
 
      [ ] 1 2
(2 )





b a g b g
b g
-
= - + +
F +
       (30) 
 
The following proposition summarizes the results under quantity competition. 
     
Proposition  4.    (i)  If  the  duopolistic  market  is  weak  price  discrimination  reduces  social 
welfare. (ii) If the duopolistic market is strong it is satisfied the necessary condition for price 
discrimination to increase social welfare. 
 
To understand proposition 3 and 4, it could be useful to make a comparison with the results 
under multiproduct monopoly. Consider a multimarket firm which is a monopolist in the two   -23- 
 
 
markets and produces two product varieties: A and B. Product A is sold in both markets and 
product B is only sold in market 2. We shall next show that, with linear demands, a move 
from uniform pricing to price discrimination does not change the total output of products A 
and B; that is,  1
m m
A x x D = -D  and  0
m
B x D =  (where superscript m  denotes monopoly). A move 
from uniform pricing to price discrimination leads to the following changes in prices: 
 
   
( / ) ( / )
,
2( / )
m m m B A A B
E A A
B B
D p D p d
p p p
D p b
¶ ¶ + ¶ ¶
D = - D = D
¶ ¶
       (31) 
 
    
1 1 1
1 1
/ ( / ) ( / )
.
/ 2( / )
m m m m m B A A B
A B B
A A B B
dD dp D p D p b d
p p p p p
D p D p b b
¶ ¶ + ¶ ¶
D = - D - D = - D + D
¶ ¶ ¶ ¶
   (32) 
   
The maximization of the profits of market 2 requires that the price of product j be adjusted in 
response to a change in the price of product i, taking into account that goods are substitutes 
and, thus, that the externality between them is internalized (condition (31) and second term of 
(32)).  The  first  term  in  (32)  represents  the  standard  price  adjustment  implied  by  price 
discrimination.  Under  linear  demands  we  can  express  the  changes  in  the  outputs  as: 
1 1 1 1 1 1 ( / ) x dD dp p b p D = D = - D   and  ( / ) ( / ) , i i i i i j j i j x D p p D p p b p d p D = ¶ ¶ D + ¶ ¶ D = - D + D  
, , , . i j A B j i = ¹  Therefore, given (31) and (32), we get  1
m m
A x x D = -D  and  0
m
B x D = . Note that, 
if we consider a single-product monopoly, the price adjustment to the difference in elasticity 
between markets would be  2 1 2 1 ( / )
m m p b b p D = - D , and the total output would be unchanged, 
1 1 1 2
m m m x b p x D = - D = -D . In any case, we obtain the standard result according to which under 
pure monopoly and linear demands price discrimination reduces welfare because the total 
output (of each product) does not change. 
 
When  the  multimarket  seller  meets  competition  in  one  market,  market  2,  results  change 
drastically. First note that the existence of a competitor in market 2 makes the total output of 
each product change with the pricing policy. The reason for this is that firms maximize their 
own profit function without taking into account the effect of their price choices on the rival’s 
demand. The changes in the prices of the rival,  B p D , and the multimarket firm,  A p D  and  1 p D , 




( ) ( / )
,
2( / ) 2
B A B A
B A A A
A B B
dR p D p d
p p p p
dp D p b
¶ ¶
D = D = - D = D
¶ ¶
        (33) 
 
    
1 1
1




A B A B
A B B
A A B B
dD dp dR p dR p
p p p p
D p dp dp
D = - D - D + D
¶ ¶
     
           
1 1 1 1
1 1
/ ( ) / /
/ / 2 /
A B A B
B B
A A B A A A A
dD dp dR p dD dp D p
p p p p
D p dp D p D p
¶ ¶
= - D + D = - D - D
¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶
 








= - D + D                   (34) 
 
Condition  (33)  reflects  the  rival  reaction  to  a  change  in  the  multimarket  seller’s  price 
according to its reaction function. Given that it does not take into account the effect on the 
demand of product A, the change in the rival’s price,  B p D , is too low (in absolute value) from 
the point of view of the industry profit (but not necessarily from a welfare point of view). The 
first term in (34) is the price adjustment implied by price discrimination, similar to that under 
multiproduct  monopoly  (see  (32)),  and  the  second  one  is  the  adjustment,  following  its 
reaction function, to the change in the rival’s price. Note that, by comparing (31)-(32) with 
(33)-(34), given a change in the price of market 1, the changes in the prices of product A and 
B in market 2 are lower (in absolute value) under competition than under monopoly; as a 
consequence, the output of each firm changes with the multimarket seller’s pricing policy. 
The output change of the multimarket seller in market 1 and 2, its total output change and the 
change  in  the  rival’s  output  are:  1 1 1 x b p D = - D ,  1 1 ( / 2) A B x b p d p D = D + D , 
1 ( / 2) A B x x d p D +D = D  and  ( / 2) B A x d p D = D  (at the equilibrium prices we obtain the same 
output changes as in (24) and (25)). Note that sign ( A x D ) = - sign ( B x D ), sign ( 1 A x x D +D ) = 
sign ( B x D ), and that the change in the output of market 1 is greater than the one in the total 
output of market 2:  1 A B x x x D +D < D . If the duopolistic market is weak, then both firms 
reduce  prices,  0 A p D <   and  0 B p D < ,  the  total  output  of  each  firm  is  reduced  and,  as  a 
consequence,  price  discrimination  reduces  social  welfare.  When  the duopolistic market is 
strong then both firms increase prices,  0 A p D >  and  0 B p D > , the total output of each firm 
increases and, as a consequence, it is satisfied the necessary condition for price discrimination 
to lead to a welfare improvement.. 
   -25- 
 
 
We now turn to the lower bound (26). Notice that if the duopolistic market, market 2, is 
strong, then  1 0 x D >  and 1 A B x x x D +D < D . However, in the lower bound, the change in the 
total output in market 2 receives more weight than the output change of market 1. Therefore 
the sign of lower bound is not determined. The lower bound provides a sufficient condition 
for price discrimination to increase welfare, namely,  1 2 [ ( ) ] (2 ) bd a b d c b d A - - > - . We can 
rewrite this condition as: 
 
 
* * * * *
1
* * * * *
1
( ) ( , ) 2 ( , )
( ) 2 ( , ) ( , )
R
A A A B AB A B
R
A A A B AB A B
p p p p p








where ( / )( / ) AB B A A B D p p D e = ¶ ¶   is  the  cross-price  elasticity.  Note  that  if  the  elasticity 
difference  between  market  1  and  2  under  price  discrimination  is  low  enough,  then  the 
sufficient condition for price discrimination to increase social welfare is satisfied. Another 
equivalent  form  to  write  this  condition  is: 
* *
1 ( )/( ) ( )/( )
m m





A p c -  is the price-cost mark up under multimarket monopoly for product A. On the other 
hand,  from  Lemma  3,  even  if  the  lower  bound  were  negative  price  discrimination  could 
increase welfare if the upper bound is higher than the lower bound in absolute value. 
 
Market opening under price discrimination and price competition 
 
In the above analysis we have assumed that both markets are served under uniform pricing; 
that is, the multimarket seller sells in both markets. The following proposition analyzes the 
effects on social welfare when price discrimination makes the multimarket seller open the 
weak market. 
 
Proposition  5.  When  the  multimarket  seller  only  serves  the  weak  market  under  price 
discrimination: (i) If the duopolistic market is weak price discrimination increases welfare, 
given that uniform pricing leads to a monopolization of the weak market by the rival. (ii) If 
the duopolistic market is strong price discrimination yields a Pareto improvement by opening 
the weak market.   -26- 
 
 
Proof.  Note that for case (i) the lower bound on welfare change is 
* * ( ) ( ) A A B B p c x p c x - D + - D  
given that  1 0 x D = . As firm A does not serve market 2 under uniform pricing, then 
*





B B x x x D = -  because firm B is a monopolist in market 2 under uniform pricing. If the 
Bertrand equilibrium is symmetric (this is not strictly necessary), 
* *
A B p p = , the lower bound 
can be written as 
* * *
2 ( )( )
m
A A B p c x x x - + - , and this in general will be positive given that a 
duopoly produces more than a monopoly. (ii) When the duopolistic market is strong, and if 
the  weak  market  is  not  served  under  uniform  pricing,  then  the  lower  bound  is  positive: 
1 1 ( ) 0
m p c x - D >  given that  0 A B x x D = D =  and  1 1
m x x D = . In fact, price discrimination yields a 
Pareto improvement because it benefits consumers in the weak market (market 1), benefits 
the multimarket seller, but does not harm either consumers or the rival in market 2. Q.E.D. 
 
Social and private incentives to price discriminate 
 
Our results allow us to understand under what conditions a multimarket seller would choose 
to  engage  in  price  discrimination  or  engage  in  uniform  pricing  and  also  the  welfare 
implications of such behaviour. If the duopolistic market is strong, the multimarket seller will 
choose to price discriminate (proposition 1) and, under linear demands, price discrimination 
can  be  welfare  improving  (proposition  2).  When  the  duopolistic  market  is  weak,  price 
discrimination increases the profit of the multimarket seller in one market but this can be 
reduced in the other market. Therefore, the choice of pricing policy is not clear, but it is 
possible, for example in the linear case, to find situations in which the multimarket seller 
chooses not to price discriminate. From a social welfare point of view price discrimination 
would reduce welfare under linear demands (proposition 2). Therefore, private incentives to 
price discriminate may be compatible with social incentives. The next Corollary summarizes 
the results. 
 
Corollary 3.  Under linear demands and price competition, if the multimarket seller uses a 
uniform  pricing  policy,  society  will  prefer  this  choice.  If  society  benefits  from  price 
discrimination, the multimarket firm will make this choice. 
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These  results  contrast  with  those  under  monopoly:  a  monopolist  (single  or  multiproduct) 
never benefits from uniform pricing and price discrimination reduces social welfare under 
linear demands. In fact, as the following remark states, private incentive to price discriminate 
is opposed to social incentive. 
 
Remark 1. Under linear demand and (single or multiproduct) monopoly, the welfare loss due 
to price discrimination is equal to a half of the profit gain: 
1
2
m m W p D = - D .
24 
 
When the multimarket firm only serves the weak market under price discrimination, then this 
pricing policy increases both the multimarket seller’s profit and social welfare. As several 
authors have emphasized for the case of monopoly, the banning of price discrimination is 
particularly harmful if it leads to the closure of markets. But it should also be noted that, 
under uniform pricing, a multimarket seller is more likely to abandon the weak market when 
it is a duopolist in this market instead of a monopolist. 
 
On the “meeting competition defence”  
 
The  linear  demand  analysis  serves  to  illustrate  some  perverse  effects  arising  from  the 
Robinson-Patman Act.
25 Assume that the multimarket seller engages in price discrimination, 
and imagine that the Federal Trade Commission initiates a case against this firm under section 
2  of  the  Robinson-Patman  Act  (which  says  that  it  is  unlawful  “to  discriminate  in  price 
between different purchases of commodities of like grade and quality”). The Act permits the 
multimarket seller to rebut the presumption of illegality by showing that its discriminatory 
price  was  quoted  “in  good  faith  to  meet  an  equally  low  price  of  a  competitor”.  As  the 
following proposition states, for the case of linear demands, this defence may allow price 
discrimination to occur in situations in which it would reduce welfare. 
 
                                            
24 Varian’s (1985) result that the welfare loss is equal to the profit gain in the linear demand case is incorrect as 
Layson (1988) shows. In the Appendix, we provide an alternative proof based on Lemma 3. 
25 See Schwartz (1986) for a review of perverse effects of the Robinson-Patman Act.   -28- 
 
 
Proposition 6. (i) If the duopolistic market is weak, the “meeting competition” defence (if it 
were  successful)  allows price discrimination precisely when it reduces welfare. (ii) If the 
duopolistic  market  is  strong,  though  price  discrimination  can  be  welfare  improving,  the 
“meeting competition” defence cannot be invoked. 
 
This defence could be used successfully (in an economic sense) if the duopolistic market were 
weak but not if it were strong. However, if linearity of demand is not a bad approximation, we 
might  expect  the  impact  of  price  discrimination  on  welfare  to  be  negative  when  the 
duopolistic  market  is  weak  (see  propositions  3  and  4).  Therefore,  the  banning  of  price 
discrimination would imply a welfare improvement. When the duopolistic market is strong 
the “good faith meeting” defence is unsuccessful but to allow price discrimination, precisely 
in this case, can increase social welfare. Note that the above conclusions depend on both 
markets being served under uniform pricing (see proposition 5). 
 
5.  Concluding remarks 
   
With respect to the welfare analysis of third-degree price discrimination, this paper offers 
some contributions. The existence of a competitor in one market makes price discrimination 
by  a  multimarket  seller  welfare  improving  in  settings,  linear  demands,  where  price 
discrimination  would  reduce  welfare  if  the  multimarket  seller  were  a  monopolist  in  both 
markets. The banning of price discrimination is particularly harmful when it leads to some 
markets not being served by the multimarket seller: not only may it lead to the closure of 
markets  but  also  to  market  monopolization  by  the  rival.  The  paper  also  illustrates  some 
perverse  effects  arising  from  the  Robinson-Patman  Act.  We  show  that  the  “meeting 
competition” defence may be used successfully (in an economic sense) precisely in cases 
where price discrimination would reduce welfare. 
 
Results do not depend on the type of competition in the duopolistic market. We have shown 
that  results  under  quantity  competition  are  similar  the  qualification  being  that  strategic 
variables  become  strategic  substitutes.  This  fact  makes  the  strategic  effects  of  price   -29- 
 
 
discrimination,  in  comparison  with  uniform  pricing,  different  from  those  under  price 
competition. However, it is possible to reproduce similar welfare effects, in particular for the 
linear demands case. 
  
It  has  been  argued  that  price  discrimination  encourages  entry  because  a  firm  which  is 
established in one market can enter a new market which may need to set a low price without 
having to lower the price in its home market.
26 However, it has also been argued that price 
discrimination may deter entry: a multimarket incumbent can credibly threaten to respond 
more aggressively to a single-market entrant when the incumbent can make targeted price cuts 
directed against the entrant (see Katz, 1987). The findings of this paper allow us to show that 
both arguments are compatible. Note that to argue that price discrimination encourages entry 
is the same as saying that price discrimination may serve to open markets, and therefore, it 
may lead to a welfare improvement, even in the Pareto sense (proposition 5). Throughout the 
paper we have assumed that the rival firm is a well established firm, but the model also allows 
us to reach conclusions when this firm is a potential entrant and it has to decide whether to 
enter or not. If the duopolistic market is weak, the multimarket seller’s behaviour is more 
aggressive under price discrimination than under uniform pricing (see proposition 1), and the 
former  policy  might  deter  entry  by  reducing  the  entrant’s  profits.
27  However,  it  must  be 







                                            
26  The  U.S.  Department  of  Justice  (1977)  (see  Katz,  1987)  and  Hausman  and  MacKie-Mason  (1988),  for 
example, present variants of this argument. 
27 The effects on entry of for example banning price discrimination would be rather similar to those arising when 
an incumbent firm follows a most-favoured-customer pricing policy. See Aguirre (2000).  
28 Of course, the consequences of entry deterrence on social welfare are ambiguous since the size of the entry 





Proof of Lemma 2 
(i)  { } { }
* *
1 1 min , max ,
m u m
A A p p p p p £ £  
(ii) If 
* u
A p p ³   then 
* u
B B p p ³  and if 
* u
A p p £  then 
* u
B B p p £  (and vice versa). 
Part  (ii)  of  Lemma  2  is  obvious  given  that  the  reaction  functions  are  upward  sloping.  If 
* u
A p p ³  then 
* * ( ) ( )
u u
B B A B B p R p R p p = ³ =  and if 
* u
A p p £ then 
* * ( ) ( )
u u
B B A B B p R p R p p = £ =  . 
If 
* u
B B p p ³   then 
* * ( ) ( )
u u u
A A B A B p R p R p p = ³ =   given  that 
* u
B B p p ³   implies 
( ) ( )
* ( ) ( )
u u
B A B B A B R R p R R p ³ . We next demonstrate part (i) by showing that   
(a) if 
* u
B B p p ³  then  { } { }
* *
1 1 min , max ,
m u m
A A p p p p p £ £  and  
(b) if 
* u
B B p p £  then  { } { }
* *
1 1 min , max ,
m u m
A A p p p p p £ £ .  
(a) If 
* u
B B p p ³  then 
* * ( ) ( )
u u u
A A B A B p R p R p p = ³ = . We know from Lemma 1 that the concavity 
of the profit functions implies that  { } { } 1 1 min ( ), ( ) max ( ),
m u m
A B A B A B R p p R p R p p £ £ . So given 
the  rival’s  prices 
*  and 
u
B B p p   we  have  that  { } { }
* * *
1 1 min ( ), ( ) max ( ),
m u m
A B A B A B R p p R p R p p £ £  
and  { } { } 1 1 min ( ), ( ) max ( ),
u m u u u m
A B A B A B R p p R p R p p £ £ . As 
* u
B B p p ³  and the reaction function is 
upward  sloping  then  { } { }
*
1 1 max ( ), ( ),
u m m
A B A B R p p R p p £   and  therefore 
{ } { } { }
*
1 1 1 min ( ), ( ) max ( ), max ( ),
u m u u u u m m





A p p p £ .  We  next  show  that  { } 1 1 min ( ),
u m m
A B R p p p = ;  if  this  occur  then 
{ }
*
1 1 min ( ),
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A p p p £ . Suppose, on the contrary, that 
{ } 1 min ( ), ( )
u m u
A B A B R p p R p = ; then, as  { } { }
*
1 1 min ( ), min ( ),
u m m
A B A B R p p R p p £  there would be 
two possibilities: (1)  { }
* *
1 min ( ), ( )
m
A B A B R p p R p =  and (2)  { }
*
1 1 min ( ),
m m
A B R p p p = . Case (1) 
would imply that  
* *
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A B A B A B A B R p R p p R p R p p £ = £ £ £  and case (2) would lead to 
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A p p p = =   and 
* u
B B p p = . The best response functions  ( ) A B R p  and  ( )
u
A B R p  are 
upward  sloping  (with  slopes  less  than  one)  and  as  can  be  easily  proved 
[ ( ) ( )]/ 0
u
A B A B B d R p R p dp - > , thus implying that  ( ) A B R p  and  ( )
u
A B R p  cross once at most. 
(b) If 
* u
B B p p £  then 
* * ( ) ( )
u u u
A A B A B p R p R p p = £ = . From Lemma 1, the concavity of the profit 
functions implies that  { } { } 1 1 min ( ), ( ) max ( ),
m u m
A B A B A B R p p R p R p p £ £ . So given the rival’s 
prices 
*  and 
u
B B p p   we  have  that  { } { }
* * *
1 1 min ( ), ( ) max ( ),
m u m
A B A B A B R p p R p R p p £ £   and 
{ } { } 1 1 min ( ), ( ) max ( ),
u m u u u m
A B A B A B R p p R p R p p £ £ . As 
* u
B B p p £  and the best response function   -31- 
 
 
is  upward  sloping  then  { } { }
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1 1 max ( ), ( ),
u m m
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A p p p ³ . Suppose, on the contrary, that 
{ } 1 max ( ), ( )
u m u
A B A B R p p R p = ; then, as  { } { }
*
1 1 max ( ), max ( ),
u m m
A B A B R p p R p p ³  there would be 
two possibilities: (1)’  { }
* *
1 max ( ), ( )
m
A B A B R p p R p =  and (2)’  { }
*
1 1 max ( ),
m m
A B R p p p = . Case (1)’ 
would  imply  that 
* *
1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
m u u u u
A B A B A B A B p R p R p R p R p £ £ £ £   and  case  (2)  would  lead  to 
* *
1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
u m u u u u
A B A B A B A B R p R p p R p p R p £ £ £ = £ .  Once  again  these  conditions  cannot  be 
satisfied by the equilibrium prices. Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Lemma 3 
 
The aggregate utility function is given by: 
 
1 1 1 2 ( , , ) ( ) ( , ) A B A B u x x x y u x u x x y + = + +  
 
                       
2 2 2
1 1 1 1
1 1
( ) ( 2 )
2 2
A B A A B B x x x x x x x x y a b a b g b = - + + - + + +  
         
                         
It is easy to check that the consumer surplus in market 1 and 2 is, respectively: 
 
2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
( ) ( ) ( ) ,
2





( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) .
2 2
A B A B A A B A B A B B A A B B S x x u x x p x x x p x x x x x x x b g b = - - = + +  
 
Consider two configurations of output, 
0 0 0
1 ( , , ) A B x x x  and 
1 1 1
1 ( , , ) A B x x x , with associated prices 
0 0 0
1 ( , , ) A B p p p  and 
1 1 1
1 ( , , ) A B p p p . The changes of the consumer surplus in market 1 and 2, which 
are due to a move from 
0 0 0
1 ( , , ) A B x x x  to 
1 1 1
1 ( , , ) A B x x x , are, respectively: 
 
1 0




S x x x b D = + D  
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1 0 1 0 1 1
2
1 1
( ) ( ) ( ),
2 2
A A A B B B A B B A S x x x x x x x x x x b b g D = + D + + D + D + D  
 
By using inverse demands and rearranging, we get: 
 
0 1











A B A A B B S x x p x p x a D = D +D - D - D  
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
.
2 2 2 2
A A B B A B B B B A x x x x x x x x x x b b g g g + D + D + D - D + D  
The changes of profits in market 1 and 2 are, respectively: 
1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 ( ) ( ) p c x p c x p D = - - -  
1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
2 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) A B A A A A B B B B p c x p c x p c x p c x p p p D = D +D = - - - + - - -  
 
By adding and subtracting 
0 1
1 1 ( ) p c x -  to the first expression and 
0 1 ( ) A A p c x -   and 
0 1 ( ) B B p c x -  to 
the second and rearranging, we get:  
0 1
1 1 1 1 1 ( ) p c x p x p D = - D +D  
0 0 1 1
2 ( ) ( ) A A B B A A B B p c x p c x p x p x p D = - D + - D +D +D  
Given that  1 1 1 p x b D = - D   ( ) A A B p x x b g D = - D + D  and  ( ) B B A p x x b g D = - D + D , we obtain: 
0 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 ( ) p c x x x p b D = - D - D                    (A1) 
0 0 1 1 1 1
2 ( ) ( ) . A A B B A A A B B B B A p c x p c x x x x x x x x x p b g b g D = - D + - D - D - D - D - D     (A2) 
 
The changes in social welfare in market 1 and 2 are, respectively: 
0 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
( ) ( )
2 2




1 1 1 1
1 1
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                             ( ) ( )
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1 1 1 1 p x a b = - ,  
1 1 1
A A B p x x a b g = - -  and 
1 1 1
B B A p x x a b g = - - , we obtain: 
 
0 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1
( ) ( )
2 2
W p c x p c x D = - D + - D                  
 
0 0 1 1
2
1 1 1 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 2 2
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W W W UB LB D = D +D = + .  Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Remark 1. Welfare effects of price discrimination under monopoly 
 
Denote by  1
m p , 
m
A p  and 
m
B p  the monopoly prices under price discrimination and let 
s p and 
s
B p    
be the monopoly prices under uniform pricing (that is, when the monopolist is constrained to 
sell product A  at the same price, 
s p , in market 1 and 2). Let  1 ( , , )
m m m
A B x x x  and  1 ( , , )
s s s
A B x x x  be 
the  associated  outputs.  It  is  easy  to  show  that  under  linear  demands  price  discrimination 
reduces  welfare  because  the  total  output  does  not  change; 1 0 A x x D +D =   and  0 B x D = . 
Therefore, the upper bound on the welfare change is zero and the lower bound is negative; as 
a  consequence,  given  the  above  results,  (1/ 2) 0.
m W LB D = <   It  is  useful  to  rewrite  the 
welfare change in terms of the change of the monopoly profits. The welfare change can be 
expressed, from (A3) and (A4), as: 
 
  1 2 1 1 1 1
1 1
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m m m m m m
A B A W W W c x x c x x x a b a b g D = D +D = - - D + - - - D . 
 If outputs  1 ( , , )
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m m m m
A B A W x x x x x b b g D = D + + D . 
Given  (A1)  and  (A2),  the  change  of  the  monopoly  profit  is: 
1 2 1 1 1 ( )
m m m m m m
A B A x x x x x p p p b b g D = D +D = - D - + D .  Thus  (1/ 2) .
m m W p D = - D   It  is 
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